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GENE CAL VIN WINCH and
CLAUDE C. WINCH,
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12377

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Statement of Facts in her Brief is substantially correct, assuming, as we must, the portions of
the evidence most favorable to Plaintiff. For brevity,
however, we will not enlarge on the facts here, as we refor to testimony from the record in the argument.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THERE WAS A COMPLETE LACK OF ANY
EVIDENCE OF WILFUL MISCONDUCT ON THE
PART OF DEFENDANT GENE CALVIN WINCH.

The Plaintiff contended at the trial, and here, that
the jury could find wilful misconduct because of the
following evidence:
1

That he was transporting Plaintiff on a motor
cycle on an obvious social ride; that he was at
temping to pass "the black car'' (Witness Draper)
on the right, with 10 feet between the car and the
motorcycle in a 19 foot wide lane; that he failed
to see an aUeged right turn signal given by the
Anderson car ahead of "the black car"; that according to the "expert" Officer Lord, he was
traveling between 32.5 miles per hour to 51 mile'
per hour, in a 35 mile per hour zone.
We believe that Plaintiff at the trial, and here, is
under the belief that all she need prove as wilful, is to
convince a jury, or this Court, that Defendant intentionally or consciously acted, and that an accident then happened. That such an argument is completely fallacious
seems almost unnecesary to argue. In Pettingill vs.
Moede, 129 Colo. 484, 271 P.2d 1038, the Supreme Court
of that State says:
"Unless he be unconscious, any driver of an
automobile is conscious of his conduct.
"For the purpose of properly construing this
statute, ordinary or simple negligence should be
considered as resulting from a passive mind,
while a wilful and wanton disregrard expresses
the thought that the action of which complaint is
made was the result of an active and purposeful
intent. Wilful action means voluntary; by choice;
intentional, purposeful.
"One may be said to be guilty of wilful
wanton disregard when he is conscious of
misconduct, and although having no intent to injure anyone, from his knowledge of surrounding
circumstances and existing conditions, is aware
2

that his conduct in a natural sequence of events
will probably result in injury to his guest, and is
unconcerned over the possibility of such result.
"A failure to act in prevention of accident is
but simple negligence; a mentally active restraint
from such aetions is wilful Omitting to weigh
consequences is simple negligence; refusing to
weigh them is wilful
"Without realization of the danger, it is unrealistic to say that he was intentionally, heedlessly reckless, guilty of wilful and wanton
conduct, and disregardful of the safety or rights
of his guest, or others."
There is no dispute in the evidence that the stage
was set for this accident when the Defendant, with his
guest on the motorcycle, came to a stop for a red light
on 40th West at its intersecion with 41st South. While
stopped, "the black car", heading in the same direction,
north, also stopped.
When the light turned green, both vehicles proceeded
straight ahead. There was a conflict in the evidence as
to which vehicle cleared the intersection first, but again,
considering the evidence, in the light most favorable to
the Plaintiff, we will accept the testimony of the driver
of "the black car", Mr. Draper, and the Plaintiff, for
the purpose of this Brief.
Mr. Draper testified at T-224:
"I started across the intersection, and when I
was across the intersection, he passed me on the
3

right, or pulled ahead 0f me a little _ . he slowed
down evidently and fell behmd me. Then I would
say we went down the road about 125 feet and he
started to come back along the right side of my
car. He stayed there for a few moments and
started dropping back."
"After he fell back it was a short distance ...
Mrs. Anderson (the car ahead of the witness)
started to signal . . . and she started slowing
down."

T-225:
"Then Gene started to come up beside me until
the front wheel of his bike was even with my right
rear wheels."
" ... Right after (Mrs. Anderson) signal light
came on she hit her brakes
but at the time
Gene was off to my right and a little behind me,
and I figured from where he was sitting he
wouldn't be able to see her signal light so I moved
farther to the center line in hopes he could see
her signal light so he could come up along side of
me again."
<

•

<

"Q. You mean his position with relation to your
car was such that you thought he might have
difficulty seeing
A. Yes, I felt he would."
T-229:
"Q. And there was about 10 foet between you and
the motorcycle1
A. Yes, I would say so."
As to speed the witness testified at T-233 ·
4

1

"Well, when I started going out and around
her
, I wasn't going that fast in beginnng'. I
had slowed down. As a matter of fact, I had the
shift into a lower gear in order to keep the car
running. At the time I went around her I don't
think I was going over 10 miles an hour."
T-234:

"Q. Now, in regard to Gene Winch's speed .
as you moved out just before the impact, do
you have an opinion as to how fast he was
A. Well, I am kind of bad at judging.

Q. Give me your best judgment.
A. I figure between 30 to 35.''
The witness then turned into the south bound lane,
to pass behind Mrs. Anderson, and testified at T-236:
"The front end of my car was just about
directly behind Mrs. Anderson's car at the point
of impact."
Appellant makes great moment of the claim that
Defendant was attempting to pass vehicles on the right,
which Defendant denied. But assume he was. He had a
legal right to do so under 41-6-56, U.C.A.
"PASSING UPON RIGHT - When Permissible.
(a) The driver of a vehicle may over take and
pass upon the right of another vehicle
only under the following conditions.
(2) Upon a street or highway with unob-

structed pavement not occupied by parked
vehicles of sufficient width for two more

5

limes of moving vehicles in each dneetion; .. , j' (Emphasis ours)
The law does not require that la;n.es be marked, before passing on the right is permitted. Even on streets
that are laned for traffic traveling in the same direction,
the Court can take Judicial Notice of the fact that on
some streets the sides of the cars are only two or three
feet apart, and yet passing on the right is permitted.
The record is completely devoid of any facts remotely resembling wilful misconduct, and this Honorable
Court has so held.
Ricciuti vs. Robinson, 2 Utah 2d 45, 269 P.2d 282
(1954). The Defendant was allegedly driving 60 miles
per hour in a 30 mile zone, when a cigarette dropped from
his mouth, and while searching for it, the car left the road
and the Plaintiff guest was injured. The Honorable
Court stated:

"Counsel for Plaintiff concedes that the wilful
misconduct contemplated under our guest statute
is the intentio71!al doing of an act or intentional
omitting or failing to do an act, with knowledge
that serious injury is a probable and not merely a
possible result, or the intentional doing of an act
with wanton and reckless disregard of the possible
consequences." Citing Stack vs. K earnes, 118
u tah 237' 221 p .2d 594, 597).
"We are aware of the principle that ordinarily
the matter of wilful misconduct is a jury question,
but not where the facts are such that reasonable
minds could not conclude that Defendant showed
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that type of rntention or knowledge, or indulged
in that type of aggravated negligence necessary
to create liability on account of wilful misconduct
in guest passenger cases."
In that case, as in the case at bar, the only evidence
that the Defendant was in fact traveling at the claimed
higher speed was the dubious testimony of an officer who
was permitted to give an opinion without proper foundation.

Roylance vs. Davies, 18 Utah 2d 395, 424P.2d142:
"The Courts of this State cannot be the forum
wherein the wisdom of the (guest) statue or the
lack of it is debated. The legislature has already
performed that function, and the government has
sajd in language too clear to be misunderstood
that a guest cannot recover from his host for ordinary negligent acts in connection with the
dri0ng of an automobile in which both are ridmg.
, experience teaches that most accidents of
the kind in the instant case are not the result of
the driver's intention to harm guests or even the
result of the driver's disregard for the probable
or possible consequences of any act, but that they
are usually the result of negligence or inadvertence,
In this case it is difficult to see how any acts
done by the Defendant either singly or in combination, could have been done with kowledge that
injury to the Plaintiff was probable."

Brown vs, Frandsen, Adm'or, 19 Utah 2d 116, 426

P2d 1021,

7

"The mere fact that the host driver f P,U asleep
resulting rn an aceident, does not supply Uie
quirement of a consicous disregard of the warning symptoms that sleep is approachmg.''
Cites Milligan vs. Harwa.rd, 11 Utah 2d 74, 355 P 2d
62.
In Muka·sey vs. Aaron, 20 Utah 2d 383, 438 P.2d 702
(1968), this Court held that Defendant was entitled to a
summary judgment where the facts were that he was approaching a curve at 50 miles per hour, without keeping
a proper lookout and in failing to observe that the curve
could not be negotiated at that speed.
There being no evidence of any wilful misconduct
on the part of Defendant minor, the Honorable Trial
Court properly granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
POINT TWO
THE OWNER OF A MOTOR VEHICLE WHO
LOANS IT TO A MINOR UNDER EIGHTEEN
YEARS OF AGE IS NOT LIABLE TO A GUEST INJURED BY THE MINOR'S OPERATION OF THE
VEHICLE.

The appellant contends that the respondent Claude
C. Winch, should be held liable for the appellant's injuries due to the simple negligence of Gene C. Winch.
Thus appellant takes the rather incongruous position
that even though Gene Winch, the operator of the vehicle
may not be liable because of the "guest statute" ( 41-9-1
U.C.A., 1953, that Claude "\Vinch who had no immediate
control over the operation of the vehicle should be liable.

8
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The respondent contends that the Trial Court correctly refused to accept appellant's position and that the
correct construction of the applicable statutes precludes
holding the party who would only be vicariously liable
rP:;;ponsible for injuries to a guest due to simple negligence.
rrhe appellant's position is that since 41-2-22, U.C.A.
1953 provides that an owner of a motor vehicle is liable
for damages "caused by the negligence" of the minor
operating the vehicle with the owner1s permission that
this evidences a legislative intent to preclude the effect
of the guest statute in such cases. It does not appear
that this Court has heretofore considered this issue. In
Whitney vs. Walker, 25 Utah 2d 202, 479 P.2d 469 (1971)
this Court ruled that where a father entrusted his minor
danghfor with an automobile and through her negligence
she injured a third person not a guest that the father
would be liable. The Court did not discuss the scope of
the statute but merely observed:

"Under the statute the defendant Dave Walker
(father) was responsible for the negligent operation of the automobile."
The case cannot be taken as authority for the proposition that the owner would be liable for the simple
negligence of a minor causing injury to a gues,t.
Appellant attempts to uphold her argument creating
eaHier liability when suing one only vicariously liable by
looking to another statute, 41-2-10 (2) U.C.A., 1953,
9

which expressly imputes th0 11 negligence'' 0r
misconduct" of a nunor to the person who has signed
the drivers license application of the
From this
appellant says the intention in 41-2-22 UC.A., 1953
should be found to impose liability for not only simpk
negligence including willful misconduct because any
other interpretation would mean the owner was "rPsponsible for ordinary negligence but not for the greater
culpability of wilful misconduct" (App. Brief p.14). 1'he
respondent submits a more accurate construction would
be to hold that one "permitting" a minor to operate
vehicle is not liable for the wilful misconduct of the minor
because the legislature has not seen fit to impose such
a standard against such a person, whereas one who expressly accepts liability by signing the driver's license
applicaton becomes fully responsible for all acts of a
minor giving rise to liability. In the former case, the
wilful misconduct would be likened to an intervening
event terminatng the entrusting owner's responsibility.
In the latter case a more extended assumption of culp- '
ability is contemplated and a greater obligation contemplated. 41-2-10 (1), U.C.A., 1953 generally assumes a
paternal or paren patrae relationship between the license
applicant and the person signing, whereas 41-2-22,
U.C.A., 1953 does not. Thus the legislature could have
concluded a casual loan of a vehicle should not shoulder
the owner with liability for wilful misconduct but it
should for a parent, guardian or other responsible person
"willing to assume'' the obligations of a minor's being
licensed and possibly operating a vPhicle for over two
years before reaching age 18.
1

10

Respondents further submit that a proper constucbon of 41-2-22, U.C.A., 1953 would be that the owner
entrusting a vehicle to a minor is responsible for damage
caused by the minor's simple negligence if the simple
negligence of the minor would otherwise impose liability
on hnn. In Lowder vs. Holley, 120 Utah 231, 233 P.2d
350 (1953), this Court acknowledged the obvious purpose
of such a statute was to protect innocent third persons
from the negligence of minors who have been furnished
a vehicle by another. Minors possibly do not have inrnrance or are not financially responsible. But, it makes
no sense to say the owner is liable for damage caused by
a minor operating a vehicle in a manner that if the owner
himself were operating the vehicle no liability could be
imposed. If the action would be precluded against the
owner had he been operating the vehicle it ought not be
sustamable merely because a minor was the acting party.
F'urther, it makes little sense to say that the minor himself cannot be held liable because of the Guest Statute,
(41-9-1, U.C.A., 1953) but one not operating the vehicle
and probably remote from the opportunity to control the
vehicle or its driver is liable and cannot claim the protection of the Guest Statute. Certainly, the same underlying policy reasons apply in making the Guest Statute
applicable to both persons.
Further, 41-9-1, U.C.A., 1953, the Guest Statute, by
its very terms precludes holding Claude C. Winch liable.
Tt provides:
''Any person who as a guest accepts a ride in
11

any vehicle, moving upon any of the public high.
ways of the state. of Utah, and while so riding
as such guest receives or sustains an mjury, shall
have no right to recovery against the oumer or
driver or pBrson responsible for the operation of
such vehicle."
By expressly precluding action against the owner
and using the or as the disjunctive of driver it would appear that legislature did not intend the owner to be excluded from the protection of the Guest Statute when he
was not operating the vehicle as the driver.
Generally statutes should be construed m pan
materia and should be construed together to effectuate
the legislative purpose, Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed. §§5201, 52021. The harmonious construction
of 41-2-22 and 41-9-1, U.G.A., 1953 is to recognize that
liability under 41-2-22 will be imposed on an owner
only where the standard of negligence would also be
such as to hold the operating minor. Where the Guest
Statute is applicable to the minor's conduct recovery
against the owner should also be precluded. In Andm5
vs. Allred, 17 Utah 2d 106, 404 P.2d, 972 (1965) this
Court stated:
"Allowance should be made for the fact that
statutes are necessarily stated in general terms,
and that often there is neither the prescience to
foresee, nor sufficient flexibility of language ,tD
cover with exactitude, all of the exigencies of life
which may arise. For this reason one of the
fundamental rnles of statutory construction is
12

that the statute should be looked at as a whole
and in the light of the general purpose it was intended to serve; and should be so interpreted and
applied as to accomplish that objective, In order
to give the statute the implementation which will
fulfill its purpose, reason and intention sometimes prevail over technioo.lly applied literalness.
The purpose of our Guest Statute was to afford some protection to a generous person who
give::> a ride to another from being sued by the
guest who accepts the favor.
It is our opinion that a sensible application of
this statute, in conformity with its objective, requires that the protection extends over the entire
host-guest relationship in connection with the
giving and taking of the ride."

The appellant in her brief indicates there is authority
both ways. Cf. Bisoni vs. Carlson, 171 Kan. 631, 237 P.2d
404 (1951) and McHugh vs. Brown, 58 Del. 154, 125 A2d
583 (1956). Appellant contends the decision of the Kansas Court is applicable here, respondents submit it is not.
The Kansas statute made the owner liable if he allowed
a minor under 16 to use his vehicle. The statute was
aimed at preventing persons from loaning or permitting
minors under 16 from operating a vehicle on the highway.
The Kansas Court found the father himself negligent:
"The negligence of A. J. Carlson occurred
when he permitted his son Clayton to use the car
on the highways, although the amount of his liability would be measured by the extent of the
damages resulting.,. "237 P.2d 406.
Clearly a different policy was involved in the Kan13

sas case. There is no evidence that the minor operating
the vehicle in the rnstant case was not otherwise quah
fied to operate a motor vehicle on the highways of the
State of Utah. The record is devoid of evidence comparable to that in the Kansas case. Cf. 69 ALR 3rd 979.
Further, the Utah Guest Statute 41-9-1 U.C.A., 1953
is substantially different from the Kansas statute (G.S.
1949, 8-122b - see 237 P.2d P. 406, 407. Utah's statute
does not require the owner to be a "transporting" party,
rather it goes beyond and covers not only the owner,
operator, but person responsible for the operation of the
vehicle. The owner need not be the operator or person
responsible for its operation or a transporter.

In McHugh vs. Brown, supra, the Court applied the
Guest Statute to a case similar to the instant one and
held no liability could be imposed against the vehicle owner. It found "unsound" the argument of appellant and
ruled the Guest Statute applicable as a "harmonized"
construction of the two statutes.
In Lighe vs. Diamond, 83 Ohio App. 487, 82 N.E. 2d
99 (1947) the court reached a similar conclusion observing that the statutes when construed to apply the Guest
Statute defense are being construed in pari materia.
Finally, in Andrus vs. Allred, supra, this Court noted
the Utah Guest Statute was taken from that of California. In Benton vs. Shoss, 240 P.2d 575 (Cal. 1952)
Justice Traynor for the court observed of the California
Statute:
14

"This statute protects the driver and all perso·ns legally liable for his condu<:t from liability
to guests for ordinary negligence."
It is submitted therefore this Court should rule that
41-2-22 U.C.A., 1953 does not allow recovery from Claude
Winch where the provisions of 41-9-1, U.C.A., 1953 are
applicable. That is when the person injured is a guest
of the minor. Cf. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 473.

CONCLUSION
Appellant's Brief, under "Conclusion", she
asserts the father of Defendant minor "should answer
for his own negligence in entrusting the motorcycle to a
minor deemed incompetent by reason of age to handle
such an instrumentality'',
[n

Said statement is completely misleading. The Defendant minor was a licensed driver by the State of Utah
(T-99), and had driven motorcycles for some considerable time (T-100 et
Of more importance, Plaintiff
never, until now, has advanced the above claim of negligence in her pleadings, or at the time of trial. Her effort
to do so now is not only late, but completely unsupported
in the record.

We respectfully submit, that the judgment of the
'rrial Court should be affirmed.
15

Respectfully suhm1ttedy

L. E. MIDGLEY
Attorney for Defendants
Gene Calvin Winch and Claude C.
Winch
702 El Paso Gas Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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